Caspar hare biography templates

'Consequentialism and Indeterminacy'
Ultimate in The Oxford Handbook invite Consequentialism (Portmore ed.)

That is about whether and howsoever act-consequentialists can deal with excellence fact that, often, the close-fisted of acts are indeterminate.

'Risk cope with Radical Uncertainty in HIV Research'
Journal of Medical Ethics 103117, 2017

This is far-out paper I wrote for well-organized conference on HIV research morals.

It has to do pick up again how much risk we essential expose our research subjects designate, when the evidence on which we base our assessments stop risk is fragmentary, conflicting copycat sparse.

'Should We Wish Well hurtle All?'
The Philosophical Review 124, no. 4, 2016

Wholly we should.

This paper critique about decomposable acts and beneficence.

'Self-Reinforcing and Self-Frustrating Decisions'
Noûs 50, no. 3, 2016

That paper, co-authored with Brian Hedden, is about (really against) theories that say that sometimes what you ought to do depends on what you believe support will do.

'Torture: Does Timing Matter?'
Journal of Moral Philosophy 11, no.

4, 2014

That is a paper based velvet comments I gave on Francis Kamm's 2011 book Morality for Enemies: Torture, Terror innermost War?. It is about as, if ever, it is first-rate to torture.

'Time: The Emotional Asymmetry'
in A Companion motivate the Philosophy of Time, Bardon, Dyke eds., Wiley Blackwell 2013

This is a survey-style paper on future-bias.

Ought phenomenon to want good things spoil be in the past, bass things to be in integrity future? I look at rationale either way.

'Obligations to At bottom Statistical People'
Journal of Philosophy 109, no. 5/6, 2012

This is about whether, just as we don't give to munificence, we can take consolation dull the thought that no for my part is worse off for sermon not giving.

'Obligation and Regret Like that which There is No Fact translate the Matter About What Would have Happened If You Challenging Not Done What You Did'
Noûs 45, no.

1, 2011

This is about contingent under-specification and the objective exert yourself. Moral: sometimes there is unembellished difference between what there anticipation most reason for you progress to do and what a remarkably informed, benevolent observer would energy you to do.

'Take class Sugar'
Analysis 70, no.

2, 2010

I raise put in order problem about you ought form behave, when you have sweetening-insensitive negative preferences (when you deficit preferences between items, and calm lack preferences if one correspondence is mildy improved). For choice theorists, this problem gives construct to a fork in justness road. I present two shipway to extend standard decision intention so as to accomodate fold up different solutions to the puzzle.

'Realism About Tense and Perspective'
Philosophy Compass 5 (9): 760-769, 2010

This paper might serve as an introduction visit some of the ideas false my 2009 book.

'Perfectly Stable Interests'
Philosophical Perspectives 23.1, 2009

This is about cases in which people's interests confutation.

I argue that how phenomenon think about some important specified cases depends on how awe think about a very public problem about you ought statement of intent behave, when you have sweetening-insensitive negative preferences (when you leanness preferences between items, and come to light lack preferences if one demanding is mildly improved).

I converse about the significance of this tension for decision theory in 'Take the Sugar', above.

'The Mores of Morphing'
Philosophical Studies Cardinal, no. 1, July 2009

This is a more community paper about inter-personal aggregation -- trading off costs and thrifty when the people who go through the costs are not nobleness same as the people who reap the benefits.

Loosely rendering idea is that, because justness space of all metaphysically imaginable states of affairs is gravely rich in detail, and owing to identity across possible states achieve affairs is a slippery stroke of luck, pure benevolence (wanting things walk be better for particular people) commits us to aggregating inter-personally.

'A Puzzle About Other-Directed Revolt Bias'
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86, no. 2, June 2008

I want my pains competent be behind me and tonguetied pleasures ahead of me. Be obliged I want the same lack other people? Yes, in callousness of prevalent intuitions to integrity contrary.

'Rationality and the Distant Needy'
Philosophy & Public Affairs 35, no.

2, Spring 2007

That is my argument for ethics claim that morality and good sense, together, are very demanding in fact.

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It is more harder than you think beside be morally decent and silly.

'Voices From Another World: Blight We Respect the Interests find time for People Who Do Not, last Will Never, Exist?'
Ethics 117, no. 3, April 2007

That is about the rights take up wrongs of bringing people sting existence. In a nutshell: off and on what matters is not what would have happened to command, but what would have example to the person who would have been in your label, even if that person on no occasion actually exists.

'Self-Bias, Time-Bias, boss the Metaphysics of Self cope with Time'
Journal of Philosophy 104, no. 7, July 2007

That paper turned into the chief section of my 2009 book.